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Summary
MIT has proposed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commisssion (NRC) a project
to help develop less prescriptive safety regulation in the licensing of
advanced reactors. The proposal argues that a current outstanding Light
Water Reactor (LWR) issue is a fruitful vehicle for achieving this goal.
This paper addresses using the station blackout issue, which is currently
classified as an Unresolved Safety Issue, as the trial example. The
background, current regulation and present issue resolution are reviewed.
The current state of acceptance criteria is then critiqued using as the
principal criterion the usefulness of present approaches in licensing new
designs. On the basis of some negative findinqs including overly
prescriptive statutes and prejudices in favor of current LWR plant design, a
new acceptance criteria framework is outlined. Finally, a cooperative
MIT/NRC program to formulate and test this new regulatory approach in the
future is described.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A common criticism of current nuclear reactor safety regulation, as
embodied in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), NRC Regulatory (Reg)
Guides, Standard Review Plan (SRP), Branch Technical Positions (BTP's) and
various licensing documents (such as NUREG reports, Safety Evaluation Reports
(SER's) and Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's)), is that it has
become too prescriptive in nature. Thus, acceptable design solutions rather
than acceptance criteria, are being specified. This tendency in turn retards
the introduction of new and innovative designs since the proposal of a novel
approach assures a more lenqthy and less predictable licensing process.
Further, the bulk of the regulations focus nearly exclusively on the problems
and features of the current generation of LWR design (and design basis). As
such, it is ill-suited for the assessment of advanced reactor designs such as
next generation LWR's, HTGR's. liquid metal reactors, and other options which
are receiving increased attention during the current nuclear ordering hiatus.
In the interest of trying to learn from the LWR history and set the
stage for a more efficient licensing process, MIT has proposed a modest
project [11 with the NRC to begin to address these concerns. A major aspect
of the proposed effcrt falls under a subtask entitled, "Evolution of a
Nonprescriptive Safety Regulation Approach." This effort would utilize a LWR
safety issue for which the nature of safety requirements is well established
but which also has applicability to other reactor designs. Of the major
issues currently under active NRC resolution, the Unresolved Safety Issue
A-44 (USI-A-44) concerning station blackout seems particularly appropriate as
a vehicle for carrying out this preliminary work since the concern for plant
stabilization during electric power losses is generic to any power station.
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The purpose of this report is to define the problem in a clear way and
set the direction of this work. Following these introductory remarks, the
current regulations affecting electrical power systems are reviewed. This
discussion is centered upon three specific regulatory documents - General
Design Criteria (i.e., Appendix A to 10CFR50), Reg. Guides, and SRP (as
delineated in NUREG - 0800 [2]). As alluded to earlier, the station blackout
issue is currently classified as an Unresolved Safety Issue (USI). An action
plan to address this issue was formulated in 1980 by the NRC. The highlights
of this plan, the current research efforts being performed and the possible
direction (short term) of new regulations are addressed in the next
discussion. The USI resolution discussion is followed by a general critique
of the new and existing regulations using the criterion of their usefulness
in the licensing of new designs. As this analysis shows some serious
deficiencies, a different approach formulated specifically to improve
electrical power system acceptance criteria and plant safety in general is
proposed. The specification of an alternative strategy is followed by a
program plan which describes how the MIT/NRC program can develop the approach
into a usable licensing mechanism.
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II. CURRENT REGULATIONS
Anything more than a cursory review of the current body of regulations
affected electrical power systems would be a major report unto itself. This
point is reinforced by a review of Table 8-1 of Chapter 8 of NUREG-0800.
This table is included in this report as Appendix A. The design of
electrical power systems involve conformance to at least 6 design criteria,
12 Reg. Guides, 7 BTP's, 7 IEEE standards and the recommendations of an
existing NUREG report [3]. Of the various GDC, number 17 deals specifically
with electrical power system design and is the subject of the next
subsection. The applicable Reg. Guides are described in the subsequent
subsection. Finally, the SRP is reviewed in the final portion of this
section. Further review of the IEEE standards as well as NUREG-0660 would be
fruitful and these are planned as future work.
1. GDC 17
A copy of General Design Criteria 17 entitled, "Electric Power Systems"
is included as Appendix B to this report. The first paragraph is general in
nature and requires the inclusion of an electrical power system capable of
maintaining core cooling and assuring fuel and containment design limits.
The second paragraph requires an onsite power system that is independent,
redundant, and testable. This system must perform its vital functions
assuming a single failure. The third paragraph contains more detailed
requirements for the offsite sources including two incoming circuits which
may share a common switchyard. At least one of these circuits must be
designed to be available within a few seconds following a large LOCA. The
final paragraph contains a call for designing against common cause failures.
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Three noteworthy observations can be made. First, an explicit
consideration of reliability is lacking with redundancy and the single
failure criterion acting as surrogates. This reflects the inadequate state
of knowledge in the reliability engineering area at the time this guidance
was formulated. Second, the allowance of common switchyards regardless of
design specifics increases the potential for common cause failure without any
justification. Third, the requirement of A.C. availability with a few
seconds of a LOCA has two important ramifications. First, it is indiciative
of the emphasis upon large double-ended near-instantaneous breaks as the
chief design basis events. Second, it indicates an implicit assumption of
the plant being a current generation LWR since a specific accident response
time frame is required.
2. Regulatory (Reg) Guides
Reg Guides are documents issued by the NRC staff which describe in great
detail how licensees should formulate their designs in order to assure
conformance to applicable safety regulation. These documents vary in
specificity from general endorsements of established design practices or
industry standards (such as IEEE Standards and ASME codes) to the requirement
of specific analytical models and input assumptions. The 12 Reg Guides
related directly to electircal power systems reflect this variation. Five of
these have system level implications and address separation, independence,
testing, and maintenance. The remainder are narrower in scope in that they
address specific components such as electrical penetrations, lead storage
batteries, and diesel generators. The predisposition to diesel generators is
important since it reinforces their choice as the emergency power source of
the inconsistent performance of these devices. Of course, the choice of
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diesel generators also mirrors the requirement for rapid power restoration
typical of large LWR LOCA analysis.
3. Standard Review Plan (SRP)
The SRP, which is designated presently as NUREG-0800, is prepared for
the guidance of NRC staff reviewers as they analyze applicants' designs. Its
stated principal purpose is to assure the quality and uniformity of review
and establish a well-defined design basis. The document itself is
two-volumes (each over 2 inches thick) and is structured to correspond to
FSAR chapters. Chapter 8 concerns electric power and has been reviewed in
some detail. The chapter is divided into three sections and two appendices.
The first section is introductory and describes the general format of the
review as well as referencing other related regulatory statutes (e.g.,
10CFR50, Reg. Guides, BTP's). The second section describes the review of
offsite electrical power systems while the final section which addresses
onsite systems is further divided into A.C. and D.C. power systems. The
first appendix contains the important BTP's while the second describes the
performance of site inspections.
A review of Chapter 8 leads to a general observation that its contents
are prescriptive in nature as will be demonstrated by the following citation
of specific instances. A second major point is the bias towards diesel
generators. No general criteria or even presciptive design constraints for
non-diesel generator systems are presented save for a general caveat that
such instances will be addressed on a case by case basis. The potential
problems arise from the fact that the staff is not given any guidance in
their general review documents - the SRP.
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Some specific instances of design prescription are:
* 2 redundant single-failure proof offsite circuits with a common switch-
yard allowable (pg. 8.2-1),
* design specification of switchyard breaker control schemes (pg. 8.2-5),
* no loading of non-safety loads on emergency buses (pg. 8.3.1-2),
* detailed diesel generator design suggestions (based on NUREG-0660)
including (pgs. 8.3.1-6 to 8.3.1-7):
i) loading testing specs
ii) formal maintenance training program structure
iii) preventative maintenance program structure
iv) placement of control and monitoring equipment,
- prohibition of onsite multiunit power system crossconnections
(pg. 8.3.1-9),
- design of interconnections between load control centers to include two
tie-breakers connected in series (pg. 8.3.1-9),
- emergency diesels cannot be used for power peaking (pg. 8A-6),
- design specification of undervoltage protection system (pg. 8A-13),
- seven day supply of diesel fuel for each engine (pg. 9.5.4-2). Day or
"integral" tank overflow line, low level alarm, tanks designed for water
removal (pg. 9.5.4-5),
- diesels must have independent circulating heated water loop to increase
"first try" reliability. Also, 3-way thermostatically controlled bypass
value required (g. 9.5.5-5),
- diesel starting system to include air system of compressor, dryer, air
receivers, piping, and other components. Diesel must be able to crank
cold engine 5 times without charging receivers (pg. 9.5.6-3), and
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- design remedies for assuring lube oil flow (pg. 9.5.7-5).
If applicants choose not to conform to these specifications, they must
propose "an acceptable alternative method for complyling" with regulations
but no acceptance criteria save for GDC 17 are provided.
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III. UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (A-44) RESOLUTION
Station blackout is designated USI A-44 by the NRC in their
Congressionally-mandated program of resolving such issues on a timely basis
[4]. As identified in NUREG-0510 [5], station blackout is the complete loss
of all alternating current (A.C.) power (i.e., both offsite and onsite
sources). Without station A.C., the coolability of the core depends upon
systems which do not require A.C. power and the subsequent restoration of
power. As such the issue has both system performance and reliability
aspects. As outlined above, current regulations require diverse and
redundant offsite and onsite power supplies and the principal design
criterion is that of adequate performance in spite of a single failure. At
the time this issue was raised it was the NRC staff's opinion that despite
these requirements, electrical power reliability was not assured. The action
plan for resolving USI A-44 is reviewed in brief below. In addition to the
NRC staff, technical assistance contracts have been awarded to Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). The
information generated to date as well as future directions are then
highlighted. Since most of the technical background studies are complete,
the NRC staff is formulating a final issue resolution package which will
include new rules [6]. Though these regulations have not been officially
published, the NRC staff has offered some general features of the new
regulations and these are outlined in the final discussion of this section.
1. Action Plan
A Task Action Plan for this issue was issued in 1980 and the current
status of it is reviewed in Reference 7. A figure depicting the historical
progression is reproduced as Figure 1 in this report. Though this figure is
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somewhat confusing, three important features are discernible. First, the
resolution process is behind schedule in that the present final resolution
date is 2/85 as opposed to the original proposal of 6/82. Second, three sets
of analyses define the research effort. These are:
1) loss of offsite power at nuclear power plants,
2) reliability of emergency A.C. power supplies, and
3) station blackout accident sequence probabilities and
consequences.
The third important point is that the proposed resolution direction is
rulemaking and subsequent additions to the current set of regulations in
conjunction with the issuance of a new Reg Guide specifying how an applicant
can satisfy the new criteria. If past experience is indicative of how this
Reg Guide is formulated, very specific design constraints can be expected. A
final note is that the schedule reported in Reference 7 is itself probably
slipping but no revised information is available at this time.
2. Current Research Efforts
Two of the three research activities mentioned above have ben completed
and documented. The investigation of loss of offsite power is complete but a
formal report has not been issued. Some internal NRC documentation of this
effort exists [8]. However, an approximate occurrence rate for loss of
offsite power of 0.1/reactor-year has been mentioned in informal
conversations with knowledgeable parties. The historical record has shown
that a few complete station blackouts have occurred but, except for one,
their duration was a few minutes at most. The one exception was an incident
at the Ft. Saint Vrain HTGR where power was lost for over a half hour. The
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three major contributors to offsite power loss are switchyard failures, grid
stability, and external event outages such as those due to severe weather.
Grid problems and switchyard failures are the most benign since they can
usually be restored in a short time. Weather-related damage is of greater
concern due to the duration of their impact. Figure 2 which is extracted
from Reference 9 demonstrates these points quantitatively.
ORNL has issued a report on emergency A.C. power supply relilability
[10]. Onsite power system reliability was calculated for 18 power plants and
10 generic configurations. The three objectives of the study were:
1) assess the range of onsite A.C. system reliabilities at nuclear
plants,
2) determine major factors affecting reliability, and
3) incorporate loss of offsite power data to determine station
blackout frequency range.
Some of the major findings of the study are:
- diesel generator failure probability ranged from 0.008 to 0.1 with a
mean value of 0.025,
- common cause (both human and hardware) failures contributed to
unavailability in the range 0.0001 to 0.0042,
- scheduled maintenance unavailability ranged from 0 to 0.037 with a mean
of 0.006,
- diesel repair time ranged from 4 to 92 hours with an average of 20
hours,
- plant service water contributed significantly to unavailability,
- overall demand unreliability for onsite power systems ranged from
0.00022 to 0.048 per demand.
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The "Highlights" section as well as a few informative figures and tables from
the report are included as Appendix C. A general conclusion is that
independent diesel generator failures are important contributors to total
system unavailability. This finding is in agreement with an earlier study
[11] of LER (Licensee Event Report) data. Therefore, redundancy is of major
importance. Some modest gains are possible in maintenaence and operation
areas to decrease common cause failures. No single design area could be
identified as a primary problem and hence generic recommendations are not
made. However, in plants where redundancy is high (e.g., 1 of 3 generators
needed for success path), unavailability is dominated by common cause
failures.
SNL has issued a report documenting their analysis of station blackout
accident sequences [121. Thus, this effort will be combined with the ORNL
findings to establish a technical basis for future regulatory requirements.
The goals of the SNL study were:
1) determine core damage probabilities,
2) provide insights into reducing core damage frequencies, and
3) provide perspectives on risks associated with such events.
The "Executive Summary" as well as a few informative excerpts are included as
Appendix D to this report. The most important plant features with respect to
risk were found to be:
- ability and timing of power restoration,
- standby reliability of decay heat removal systems following A.C. power
loss,
- reliability of onsite emergency power,
- D.C. power reliability especially impact on instrumentation and decay
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heat removal equipment,
- common service water dependencies,
- RCP seal leakage potential,
- likelihood of relief valve opening and malfunction during event,
- containment design,
- operator training and performance, and
- external event impact.
Plant analyses were found to be plant design-specific in that PWR's and
BWR's of various basic configuration exhibited different susceptibilities.
For example, in the PWR, the most important equipment involved auxiliary
feedwater (i.e., turbine-driven, non-A.C. dependent pumps), battery
depletion, possible A.C. dependence of RCS isolation controls, common service
water dependencies and the potential for pump seal leakage. The external
event contribution sets a limit on achieving lower core damage frequencies
through system improvements.
3. Potential New Regulations
The regulatory resolution of this safety issue has not been formally
presented but the direction of the new approaches are known. In all
likelihood, the NRC will propose new rules which would be applicable to both
existing and new plants. It is expected that the new rules will be in
addition to the existing body of regulation. The major thrust of the
requirements will be the establishment of the ability to do without any A.C.
power for a given period of time. The exact time period would be inversely
proportional to the level of onsite diesel generator redundancy. A possible
requirement matrix is:
- 13 -
diesel redundancy no A.C. survivability period
2 out of 3 16 hours
1 out of 2 8 hours
1 out of 3 4 hours
The construction of this matrix implies a certain range of acceptable
reliabilities and risks but these are not explicitly given.
The most significant impact of such a rule would be on operating plants
due to backfit requirements. The most important element for PWR plant
response is non-A.C. dependent auxiliary feedwater flow to assure decay heat
removal. Nearly all plants have some capability to accomplish this function
through turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (TDAFWP's) which require
only D.C. power for operation. Other areas which may require more
substantial work are D.C. power systems including longevity and reliability
of storage batteries, capability of equipment to operate in moderately harsh
environments caused by the lack of ventilation, integrity of reactor
coolantpump seals during extended periods without seal flow and availability
of plant auxiliary service systems such as cooling water and compressed air.
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IV. USEFULNESS OF CURRENT AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR LICENSING
ADVANCED DESIGNS
Assuming the general directions for new regulation outlined in 111.3 are
correct, the resultant body of rules will remain prescriptive in nature. The
validity of this approach for determining backfit requirements and judging
current LWR plant design is itself questionable. The ORNL analysis of
current designs, which was formulated using the existing regulatory
structure, shows that this approach was not overly successful in promoting
acceptably reliable electrical power systems. A wide range of reliability
existed despite a fine level of design guidance contained in the regulations
(see section II). One may then argue that a continuation of this type of
approach does not present the most useful path. Nevertheless, the most
important deficiencies of the established (albeit soon to be modified)
regulatory statutes is their limited usefulness in assessing new plant
designs where system characteristics are not constrained by existing plant
layout or design criteria.
The present set of guidelines (present implies existing rules plus
proposed rules) do not focus on reliability but instead require redundancy.
The two are not synonomous. Further, the required levels of redundancy is
not validated by experience. Minute design constraints such as those
involving switchyard breaker design and diesel engine lube oil system
characteristics removes the engineering function from the manufacturer. In
effect, the rules set the design which in turn stifles innovation. The
onsite emergency power systems are assumed to be diesel generators. This
confines new designs to an alternative that the NRC itself has identified to
be less than optimal. Further, the linkage of plant performance to
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redundancy is again based on the false assumption that redundancy assures
reliability. In short, a more clearly based and flexible set of criteria
would provide a more efficient and reliable mechanism to judge new plant
designs as to their characteristics during electrical system transients. An
outline for such an alternative structure is described in the next section.
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V. DEVELOPMENT OF FLEXIBLE LESS PRESCRIPTIVE CRITERIA
The previous discussions demonstrate the potential benefits of a
different regulatory approach in the station blackout area especially if the
licensing of advanced designs is considered as important. Despite the
criticism made in the preceding critique, the goal of the regulations to
assure safety durinq electrical system upsets remains a valid constraint. As
such, the following framework is suggested in order that this design goal can
be achieved with greater certainty and such that new solutions are encouraged
or at least judged in a reasonable way. The proposed tack involves three
related criterion areas. The extent to which these criteria can be
determined is partially dependent upon the status of a number of interfacing
safety issues. Therefore after these three directions are described, the
most important related safety issues will be delineated.
1. Explicit Reliability Design Goals
Reliability is clearly the central concept in judging a system's
design. The current regulations themselves are structured around some
undetermined and unstated reliability goals. The practices of quantitative
reliability assessment have advanced to the point today that they can be used
to judge the adequacy of a system. This is especially true in the analysis
of electrical components and systems for which large data bases and a number
of demonstrated analysis techniques exist. Given this situation, the bulk
of the design-related regulations could be replaced by an explicit set of
reliability goals. The acceptance critreria should also define the important
considerations which must be taken into account in the analysis such as
common cause failures, human actions, external events and repair/testing
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strategies. The onus of design would then be placed on the applicant. For
example, redundancy may be preferred over individual component reliability or
vice versa. The regulatory review would focus on asssuring that the goals
are met. If they are not, the redesign is the applicant's concern.
2. Non-endorsement of Specific Onsite Power Sources
Despite disclaimers, the current regulations assume diesel generators
are the onsite emergency power source. This is based on the fact that nearly
all of the present LWR plant onsite power supplies rely on diesel
generators. The sudden break non-mechanistic large break LOCA design basis
prejudices the choice of emergency power supplies due to the need for
near-instantanious emergency (A.C. - dependent) equipment response to such
events. Further, the imposed assumption of offsite power loss at the time of
a LOCA forces the design choice even further. Advanced designs need not
abide by the same constraints due to a number of factors including slower
accident time constants (see V.3), refined safety criteria (see V.4), and
demonstratably reliable preferred power sources (see V.1). In short, the
removal of diesel generator design requirements would assist the review
process in that overall safety and performance will be emphasized more than
compliance to individual component restraints.
3. Reducing A.C. Dependence
The design details associated with reducing a nuclear plant's dependence
in both immediate and long term time frames are not the responsibility of the
regulatory authorities. Possible areas of fruitful research are more
reliance on D.C. dependent systems, emphasis of passive heat removal
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mechanisms and minimization of active components which require rapid changes
of state. Nevertheless, the safety criteria used to judge new designs should
allow and perhaps encourage such approaches.
One avenue for accomplishing this goal is to develop the explicit
reliability criteria discussed in V.1 in a way which gives credit to designs
that minimize A.C. dependence. The new rules currently under NRC
consideration are a step in this direction except that they reward redundancy
not reliability. The degree to which advanced designs can achieve A.C.
independence is determined in part by a number of other regulations which
impact design choices. The most important issues in this category are
discussed in the next subsection.
4. Interfacing Safety Issues
The usefulness of safety regulations is analogous to the operation of a
nuclear plant in that neither can be adequately judged on the merits of
individual parts. A valid assessment is achieved only when the integrated
structure is analyzed. Hence, the station blackout issue cannot be discussed
in a vacuum. Five issues of particular relevance are identified as requiring
explicit attention.
First, the overall content and structure of all current regulation
contain a strong bias towards conventional LWR design. This came about due
to the natural tendency to codify solutions to past problems to avoid their
repetition. Nevertheless, this tendency in itself may stifle development of
effective designs for non-LWR plants. Second, and more immediately germane
to station blackout, the current large LOCA instantaneous break assumption
has fostered the design choice of diesel generators. Experience and analysis
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has shown that the outcome has been a decrease in real safety since station
blackout events given diesel generator systems are larger contributors to
risk than are large LOCA's. In fact, while an instantaneous double-ended
break may not be physically possible, diesel failures occur frequently.
Developing safety criteria which aremechanistically based such as "leak
before break" would allow the utilization of systems which are more reliable
in expected events.
The single failure criterion permeates nuclear safety regulation. Its
development was not flawed in that it reflected the state of knowledge in the
reliability area over 20 years ago. However, its usefulness may be fading as
systems become more complex and reliability assessment techniques become more
standardized and credible. In some instances, such as the requirement for
offsite power circuits, its imposition may have caused design which did not
enhance reliability. There are surely other examples of this kind of
effect. The fourth issue is that of seismic design. This is a monumental
and complex issue unto itself but the employment of less conservative design
assumptions could encourage the use of more passive systems.
The final issue is that of safety goals. The proposed new regulations
for the resolution of the station blackout issue reflect an unofficial
internal NRC target risk limit of 10-5 core damage events per reactor year
given the occurence of a station blackout. The utilization of any value must
be based on the overall safety goals rather than setting limits on each
potential occurence. Second, improvements in electrical power system
reliability must be taken into account. For example a goal based on the
probability of an event times its consequences should be used. As such if
one design has a blackout probability of 0.001/R-yr and a core damage
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frequency of 10- 5 given a blackout has occurred, its composite index is
10- 8/R-yr. A second plant may have an improved design such that blackout
frequencies are 10- 5/R-yr but a core damage frequency given a blackout of
10-'. The second plant has the lower risk. The point is that regulation of
individual issues cannot be performed without considering the bigger picture.
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VI. MIT/NRC PROGRAM
The following summarizes the approach to evolving non-prescriptive
regulation as proposed recently by MIT to the NRC [1]. Even if all involved
parties agreed with the general content of the arguments advanced in the
previous section, formulating this new criteria set and process is itself a
major task. The following discussion outlines a framework for NRC and MIT to
work together to begin this concrete development. The suggested program
would involve two major tasks to be performed sequentially - criteria
development and test case assessment.
The first task would involve transforming the ideas outlined in section
V into a useful regulatory framework. This development would be based on the
explicit acknowledgement that station blackout is a substantial safety issue
for the plant operator as well as an item of licensing demand from the NRC.
As such, the past and present regulations as well as the experience base
accrued to date cannot be put aside. The first step of the process would
involve a careful reveiw of the relevant material by MIT to distill the
central safety concerns imbedded in the current regulations. This effort
would build upon the recent ORNL and SNL work as well as other available
information.
The second step would use these central concerns coupled with the
guidance detailed in section V to devise a new streamlined, less prescriptive
and more flexible criteria set. This effort would involve the development of
credible reliability goals and guidance for system assessment. Design
information and equipment performance data bases would be reviewed to provide
confidence that a realistic criteria set is developed. As mentioned earlier,
there are major interfacing issues. The degree to which possible changes in
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their assessment should be incorporated in this work is an open question.
Nevertheless, at this point, all other current regulations (such as large
LOCA requirements) would be assumed to be in force. The degree to which
current regulations can be relaxed in this exercise should be addressed by
the NRC and MIT when the project commences. While it is assumed this
development would be performed in an interactive mode with the NRC staff, the
final part of this task will be a thorough review of the proposed criteria
and a resolution of outstanding issues. The product of this first task would
be an acceptance criteria specification.
The second task is the formulation of a design example which satisfies
the acceptance criteria in MIT's judgment. This design would then be
"submitted" for an informal NRC review. This process provides a useful
exercise in that it would test both the criteria structure and the staff's
ability to utilize it as a licensing tool. A complicating aspect of this
task is that an electrical system design (even a less-detailed version as
would be produced by MIT) cannot be developed without specifying the plant
characteristics. Therefore, a choice of plant type must be made. The
proposed option is an advanced LWR since its performance characteristics are
better established in both operational and accident scenarios.
- 23 -
VII. REFERENCES
1. M.W. Golay et al., "Safety Regulation Of Advanced Reactors," proposal to
U.S.N.R.C., March 1984.
2. NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis
Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," U.S.N.R.C., July 1981.
3. G.L. Boner and H.W. Hanners, "Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel
Generator Reliability," NUREG/CR-0660, January 1979.
4. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Amended December 1977, Section 210.
5. NUREG-0510, "Identification Of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating To
Nuclear Power Plants," U.S.N.R.C., January 1979.
6. Personal communication with K. Kniel (U.S.N.R.C.)
7. NUREG-0606, Volume 5, No. 4, "Unresolved Safety Issue Summary,"
U.S.N.R.C., November 1983.
8. F.H. Clark, "Loss of Offsite Power at Nuclear Power Plants," letter
report to NRC March 2, 1982.
9. E.W. Hagen, ed., "Loss of Electric Power Coincident With LOCA,"
Nuclear Safety 18 (1), January-February 1977, pg. 53.
10. R.E. Battle and D.J. Campbell, "Reliability of Emergency A.C. Power
Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-2989, ORNL/TM-8545, July
1983.
11. T. Mankamo and U. Pulkkinen, "Dependent Failures of Diesel Generators,"
Nuclear Safety, 23 (1), January-February 1982, pg. 32.
12. A.M. Kolaczkowski and A.C. Payne, Jr., "Station Blackout Accident
Analyses (Part of NRC Task Action Plan A-44)," NUREG/CR-3226,
SAND82-2450, May 1983.
- 24 -
STATION BLACKOUT (A-44)
41112C EDG *aac
413121 2 64226c @an21
it 3miC 41se2 n T Complete *a11c Statistica O a -
e M3 To e*,i-WT PDol AC Ptw. 003-82T1 EDO W36UTn AnSIVeS a Mani
AC ,.wr Ode.. .. d Opew.i gEp.we. a ao AC F.w., nla5iiy nea.Mfsy Repor 6241 Stetletical 07 3fT Report 6 ar2
5aws... C...ptst. A..ly.s c..a ej. c..p.se - Completed
e..,c12 l.. ,, , M
*i i 61621 6226614U g212 am
e, .5.. .. ,,... . ...... e..Cn As....C..n.....nA-.------- A......n.... Ce ..- e'i"..... cl ..... S .. ,.T.... C .- 'c -- c..... SIc.. eveT A 0J AU 6 1 4 4 4 ? i s 42 t H 1 46C;,4w* w , 0 - 6 8 T1 31IOD o l49M T
OW2C a Sim~*
asmest 1ae et 1esi C G1212
- I U38 
U- 1641
ACPferipeC noomaedO
et Is entl Complete e6 n6e2y NRA R 201 I-sets6-1er21s .d s-ll 5wfn Ce..s aa e-aete 5111 I 11 e e-se 3121 61 16441
Complete ii mt- Diiion te1m621 Director 521121 CRGR 11441 CRGR -Nussnas 51Q er6 12-111 ss.esperede. Ce.e e s- sts- s s es
" en . p 92 n9 t 4 96s .nes er 1 ,be.
6233URE 1: N T K C
Devlo 123212SI4 or 0 U88T 166211 .6 01 sgsbtsvIM SC
tmtseneis a4 Of cm lt 10' MRle" 1631 1ff4 2
*. PI 5ssglys Com pleed U_0lw 111412 W4t.1M n 0 WO 11$T
Aeddest re I.slw tmp Revie 1164 sonS12 Peub".. osfe 116.116o Mskss0 MOOselt Coee" .606.1 s..mpeiIssb tae I ssebs 1
FI"RD1 RC AKATINPA SHDLe(ril]
I -~ I I i I III I I I I I H III
37.9% outages
restored in
0.1 to 0.32 hr
Major
contributor:
lightning
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I11 1
--- 640
6.1% outages
restored in
0.010 to
0.032 hr
Major
1.1% outages :ontributors:
restored in less lightning and
than 0.01 hr malicious
damage
Mator
contributor:
switching
0.01
18.7% outages
restored in
0.032 to
0.100 hr
Major
contributors:
lightning and
accidental
tripping
-Itl
II
12.6% outages
restored en
0.32 to 1.0 hr 11.7% outages
Major restored in 8.4% outages
contributors: 1.0 to 3.2 hr restored in
malicious 3.2 to 10.0 hr
damage. Major
lightning and contributors: Ma or
terminal lightning, contributors:
storms, and tree in line.
eQuipment snow, rost, snow. frost.failures or ice or ice, and
mal ceous
Carnage -
0.1
OUTAGE DURATION TIME (hrl
Fig. 2 Histogram: resturation of transmission4ine outages.
40
20
10z
0
0.001
0
320 Z
160
10
(f rom 19 1 )
11
APPENDIX A
Table 8-1 of Standard Review Plan
ATTACHMENT
STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
TABLE 8-1
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
The matrix of Table 8-1 identifies the acceptance criteria (denoted by "A") and the guidelines (denoted by "G") and
their applicability to the various sections of Chapter 8.0. The acceptance criteria define the requirements established
by the Commission for power systems important to safety; the guidelines amplify these requirements and provide more
explicit basis for evaluation of the conformance of the power systems to these Commission requirements. Acceptance
criteria and guidelines are not included herein when the primary review responsibility for these aspects of power
systems are reviewed in accordance with sections other than Chapter 8.0 of the SRP.
The Branch Technical Positions listed herein are contained in Appendix 8-A to Section 8.1 of the SRP.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS - TABLE 8-1
APPLICABILITY (SAR Section)
CRITERIA TITLE 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 REMARKS
1. General Design
Criteria (GDC),
Appendix A to
10 CFR Part 50
a. GDC 2 Design Bases for Protection Against A A
Natural Phenomena
b. GDC 4 Environmental and Missile Design Bases A A
c. GDC 5 Sharing of Structures, Systems, and A A A
Components
d. GDC 17 Electric Power Systems A A A
1.

TABLE 8-1 (CONTINUED)
APPLICABILITY (SAR Section)
CRITERIA TITLE 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 REMARKS
e. GDC 18 Inspection and Testing of Electrical A A A
Power Systems
f. GDC 50 Containment Design Bases A A
2. Regulatory Guides (RG)
a. RG 1.6 Independence Between Redundant G G
Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and
Between Their Distribution Systems
b. RG 1.9 Selection, Design, and Qualification G See IEEE 387
of Diesel-Generator Units Used as
co Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems
at Nuclear Power Plants
c. RG 1.32 Use of IEEE Std 308, "Criteria for G G G See IEEE 308
Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations"
d. RG 1.47 Bypassed and Inoperable Status G G G
Indication for Nuclear Power Plant
Safety Systems
e. RG 1.63 Electric Penetration Assemblies in G G See IEEE 317
Containment Structures for Light-
Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Power Plants
f. RG 1.75 Physical Independence of Electric Systems G G See IEEE 384
g. RG 1.81 Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric G G G
Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power
Plants
h. RG 1.106 Thermal Overload Protection for G G
Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves
TABLE 8-1 (CONTINUED)
APPLICABILITY (SAR Section)
CRITERIA TITLE 8.2 8.3 1 8.3. REMARKS
i. RG 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generators G
Used as Onsite Power Systems at Nuclear
Power Plants
j. RG 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric Power and G G See IEEE 338
Protection Systems
k. RG 1.128 Installation Design and Installation G See IEEE 484
of Large Lead Storage Batteries for
Nuclear Power Plants
1. RG 1.129 Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement G See IEEE 450
of Large Lead Storage Batteries for
00 Nuclear Power Plants
a3. Branch Technical
Positions
a. BTP ICSB 4 Requirements on Motor-Operated Valves G
in the ECCS Accumulator Lines
b. BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel-Generator Sets for Peaking G
c. BTP ICSB 11 (PSB) Stability of Offsite Power Systems G
d. BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the Single Failure G
Criterion to Manually-Controlled
Electrically-Operated Valves
e. BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application of RG 1.47 G G G
f. BTP PSB-1 Adequacy of Station Electric G
Distribution System Voltages
TABLE 8-1 (CONTINUED)
APPLICABILITY (SAR Section)
CRITERIA TITLE 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 REMARKS
h. BTP PSB-2 Criteria for Alarms and Indications G
Associated with Diesel-Generator Unit
Bypassed and Inoperable Status
4. NUREG Reports
a. NUREG/CR 0660 Enhancement of Onsite Diesel Generator G
Reliability
0,
APPENDIX B
General Design Criteria 17 from Appendix
A to 10CFR50
PART 50 e DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
Criterion 2-Design bases for. protection criterion 13-Instrumentation and control.
against natural phenomena. Structures. sys- Instrumentation shall be provided to monJ-
tems, and components important to safety tor variables and systems over their antici-
shall be designed to withstand the effects o7I pated ranges for normal operation. for
natural phenomena such as earthquakes. m anticipated operational occurrences. and for
tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and |- accident conditions as appropriate to assure
seiches without loss of capability to perform - adequate 'safety. including those variables
their safety functions. The design bases for and systems that can affect the fission proc-
these structures, systems, and components u ess, the integrity of the reactor core, the
shall relect: (1) Appropriate consideration 0 reactor coolant pressure boundary. and the
of the most severe of the natural phenomena containment and its associated systems. Ap-
that have been historically reported for the propriate controls shall be provided to main-
site and surrounding area, with sufficient tain these variables and systems within
margin for the limited accuracy, quantity. prescribed operating ranges.
and period of time in which the historical _
data hare been accumulated, (2) appropriate - Criterton 14-Reactor cousant pressure
combinations of the efects of normal and boundary. The reactor coolant pressure
accident conditions with the effects of the boundary shall be designed, fabricated,
natural phenomena, and (3) the importance erected, and tested so as to have an extremely
of t he safet y functioni to be performed. low probability of abnormal leakage. ofCriterion 3-Fire protection. Structures' rapidly propagating failure, and of gross
systems, and components Important to safety rupture.
shall be designed and located to minimize. Criterion 15--eactor coolant system de-consistent with other aety requirements, sin. The reactor coolant system and asso-int the probability and effect of fires and ex- n"e uiir.cnrl n rtcinss
g plosions. Noncombustible and heat resistant Liated auxiliary, control, and protection sys-
M materials shall be used wherever practical rm tems shall be designed with suScient margin
mtrughout hle uit, paricurl p il to assure that the design conditions of the
L tons such as the containment and control u. reactor coolant pressure boundary are not
room. Fire detection and fighting sys'ems e exceeded during any conditon of normal
of appropriate capacity and capability shall n operation. Including anticipated operational
be provided and designed to minimize the ad- occurrences.
verse effects of Ires on structures. ststems. Criterion 16-Containment design. Reac-
and components important to safety. Fire- tor containment and associated systems shall
fighting systems shall be designed to assure be provided to establish an essentially lea-
that their rupture or inadvertent operation tight barrier against the uncontrolled re-
does not signiacantly impair the safety capa- lease of radioactivity to the environment and
bility of these structures. systems. and to assure that the containment design con-
components. ditions important to safety are not ex-
Criterion 4-Enrironmental and enisaile de- ceeded for as long as postulated accident
sign bases. Structures, systems, and con- conditions require.
ponents imnportanit to safety shll be designed
to accommodate the effects of and to be com- Criterion 17-Electric pocer systems. An
patible with the envrionmental conditions onsite electric power system and an ofisite
associated with normal operation, mainte- electric power system shall be provided to
nance, testing, and postulated accidents, In- permit functioning of structures, systems,.
cluding Ioss-of-ooolant accidents. These and components Important to safety. The
structures, systems, and components shall be safety function for each system (assuming
appropriately protected against dynamic ef- the other system is not functioning) shall be
fects. including the effects of missiles, pipe to provide suffcient capacity and capability
whipping, and discharging fluids, that may to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel
result from equipment failures and from design limits and design conditions of the
events and conditions outside the nuclear reactor coolant pressure boundary are not
exceeded as a result of anticipated opera-
tional occurrences and (2) the core is cooled
and containment integrity and other vital
criterion functions are maintained In the event of
m and components. Structures, systems, and postulated accidents.
components important to safety shall not be The onsite electric power supplies, includ-
sh aared among nuclear power units unless It ing the batteries. and the onslte electric
can be shown that such sharing wil not sig- distribution system, shall have sufcient
niacantly impair their ability to perform Independence, redundancy, and tests.bIlity to
their safety functions, including, in the event perform their safety functions assuming a
of an accident in one unit, an orderly shut- M single failure.
wn and cooldown of the remaining units' r Electric power from the transmission net-
r. work to the onsite electric distribution
II. Protection by Multiple Fission Product system shall be supplied by two physically
Barriers Independent circuits (not necessarily on
separate rights of way) designed and locatedCriterion 10-Jeactor design. The reactor so as to minimize to the extent practical the
core and associated coolant, control, and likelihood of their simultaneous failure underprotection systems shall be designed with operating and postulated accident and en-
appropriate margin to assure that specified vironmental conditions. A switchyard com-
acceptable fuel design limits are not ex- mon to both circuits is acceptable. Each of
ceeded during r.ny condition of normal op- these clrcu'ts sha te detened to be avail-
. et.:rt alloun, E. u. A ..:c
6 Cr nnh ror.e al.ernating current pomer suppliesCriteator o-eteacor tniarent protection, and the other offsite electric power circuit,The reactor core and associated coolant sys- to assure that specifed acceptable fuel de-tems shall be designed so that in the power sign limits and design conditions of the re-( operating range the net effect of the actor coolant pressure boundary are notinherent nuclear feedback characteristics exceeded. One of these circuits shall be de-tends to compensate for a rapid increase in signed to be available within a few seconds
reactivity. following a lois-of-coolant accident to assureCriterion 12-Suppression of reactor power that core cooling, containment integrity, and
oscillations. The reactor core and associated other vital safety functions are maintained.
oomant, control, and protection systems shall Provins shall be included to minimise
whdsichca Wssui ehat icoieon eL the probability of losing electric power from
spece caceptale fuel cde itsons axceeng any of the remaining supplies as a result of,
specied acceptsbe fuel design limita r t e nuclear power ten 
not possible or can be reliably and readily or coincident with. the loss ca power gen-detected an~d suppressed* erw ytencerpwrui.tels
December 30, 1982(reset)
of power from the transmission network, or
the Ioes of power from the onsite electric
power supplies.
-.
Criterion 18-Inspection and testing of
electrical power systems. mectric. power sys-
tems important to safety slall be designed
to permit appropriate periodir inspection and
testing of
important areas and features, such as wiring,
insulation. connections, and switchboards.
to assess the continuity of the systems and
.he condition of their components. The sys-
tems shall be designed with a capability to
test periodically (1) the operability and
iunctional performance of the components
of the systems, such as onsite power sources,
relays, switches, and buses, and (2) the op-
erability of the systems as a whole and, under
conditions as close to design as practical, the
full operation sequence that brings the sys-
tems into operation, including operation of
applicable portions of the protection system,
and the transfer of power among the nuclear
power unit, the offsite power system, and the
onsite power system.
Criterion 19-Control room. A control room
shall be provided from which actions can be
taken to operate the nuclear power unit
safely under normal conditions and to main-
tain it In a safe condition under accident
conditions, including loss-of-coolant acci-
dents. Adequate radiation protection shall be
provided to permit access and occupancy of
the control room under accident conditions
without personnel receiving radiation ex-
posures in excess of 5 rem whole body, or
its equivalent to any part of the body, for
the duration of the accident,
Equipment at appropriate locations out-
side the control room shall be provided (1)
with a design capability for prompt hot shut-
down of the reactor, including necessary
instrumentation and controls , to maintain
in the unit in a safe condition during hot shut-
r. down, and (2) with a potential capability
ii for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor
a through the use of suitable procedures,
Il1. Projection and Jeactivity Control
Systems
Criterion 20-Protection system function..
The protection system shall be designed (I)
to initiate automatically the operation of
appropriate systems including the reactivity
control systems, to assure that specified ac-
ceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded
as a result of anticipated operational oc-
currences and (2) to sense accident condi-
tions and to initiate the operation of systems
and components Important to safety.
Crit erion 21-Protection system reliability
and testability. The protection system shall
be designed for high functional reliability
and Inservice testability commensurate with
the safety functions to be performed. Re-
dundancy and independence designed into
the protection system shall be sufficient to
assure that (1) no single f1ailure results in
loss of the protection function and (2) re-
moal) from service of any component or
channel does not result in loss of the re-
quired minimum redundancy unless the ac-
-eptable rellab!lty of o-r-atioan of the
prctection - -! can be ctlb-re -a ciemen-
atrated. The protecrioi system shall be de-
signed to pernut periodic testing of its func-
tioning when the reactor is in operstion,
including a capability to test channels in-
eiependently to determine failures and losses
of redundancy that may have occurrect
Criterion 22-Protection system independ-
':mce. The protection system shall be de-
signed to assure that the effects of naturalphenomena, and of normal operating, main-
lenance, testing, and postulated accident
-onditions on redundant channels do not
result in loss of the protection function. or
shall be demonstrated to be acceptable on
some other denned basis. Design techniques,
such as functional diversity or diversity in
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APPENDIX C
Highlights and Selected Excerpts from
NUREG/CR - 2989
HIGHLIGHTS
Reliability of emergency onsite ac power systems at nuclear power
plants has been questioned within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) because of the number of diesel generator failures reported by
nuclear plant licensees and the reactor core damage that could result
from diesel failure during an emergency. Because of these consider-
ations, the NRC classified the loss of all ac power (station blackout)
at a nuclear plant an unresolved safety issue. The NRC requested Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to develop a technical basis to help
resolve this issue. This report contains the results of a reliability
analysis of the onsite ac power system, and it uses the results of a
separate analysis of offsite power systems to calculate the expected
frequency of station blackout.
Included is a design and operating experience review. Eighteen
plants representative of typical onsite ac power systems and ten generic
designs were selected to be modeled by fault trees. Operating experi-
ence data were collected from the NRC files and from nuclear plant
licensee responses to a questionnaire sent out for this project. A
total of 1526 events are categorized by failure type for 120 diesel
generators, along with data on the rumber of starts, scheduled
maintenance, and repair times for 86 diesel generators.
Important contributors to onsite power system reliability vary from
plant to plant, but among the important contributors are the following:
(1) diesel generator failure probability, for which the industry-
average is 2.5 x 10-2 and the range is 8 x 10-3 to 1 x 10~ ,
(2) human-error and hardware failure common-cause failure, for
which the unavailabilities range from 1 x 10~4 to 4.2 x 10~3
(3) scheduled maintenance unavailability during reactor operation
for which the industry-average is 6 x 10-3 and the range is 0
to 3.7 x 10~2,
(4) diesel repair time, for which the average is 20 h and the range
is 4 to 92 h,
(5) plant service-water system unavailability, for which the
independent failure probability is 2 x 10-3, the common-cause
failure probability is 8 x 10-5 , and the unavailability for
scheduled maintenance is 2 x 10-3
For the 18 plants modeled, the median probabilities that the onsite
-4 -2power system will fail on demand vary from 2.2 x 10 to 4.8 x 10
Sensitivity of the onsite system unreliability to contributors 1-3
xiii
listed above is analyzed, and costs of decreasing the probabilities of
failure for these contributors are estimated. The important factors
affecting onsite ac power system reliability are dependent upon plant-
specific features. These features may be independent diesel failure,
scheduled diesel downtime, service water unavailability, or common-cause
failure of the diesels.
Independent failure of diesel generators is an important contributor
to the probability of failure of an onsite ac power system, but signifi-
cantly reducing the industry-average probability of independent diesel
failure will be difficult because there is no single subsystem that
dominates the failure probability. Common-cause failure probability may
be reduced inexpensively by improving operating and maintenance proce-
dures and eliminating some design features which have a common-cause
failure potential. Plants which have two reactors and which require
two-of-three diesels to cool both reactors after a loss of offsite power
have the least reliable diesel configuration. By adding a diesel, such
a plant could improve the onsite ac system reliability by a factor of
5 to 10. However, the approximate cost to add a 3000-kW diesel is
$20-$30 million. The costs and reliability improvement for other, less
expensive modifications are also included in this report.
xiv
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24
ORNL-DWG. 82-205o4
15
10
5
I-i
0
4.J
0
1~d
G)
C.,
GJ
0
w
.0
z
Fig. 4.2.
--
0 10
H-
70 80
of demands
20 30 40 50 60
Average Number of Demands
Number of diesel generators vs number
per year (1976-1980).
90
I
I
APPENDIX D
Executive Summary and Selected Excerpts
from NUREG/CR - 3226
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The complete loss of AC electrical power to the essential and
nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant is referred
.to as a "Station Blackout." Because many safety systems required
for reactor core decay heat removal are dependent on AC power, and
since a number of precursor events to station blackout have occurred,
the importance of this issue was raised to that of an "unresolved"
safety issue.
This work coupled with a companion report by Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) [1] provides a technical basis for resolving the
station blackout issue. This report focuses on the accident sequence
analysis portion of the program by (1) determining core damage
probabilities, (2) providing insights and sensitivity reviews for
lowering the core melt frequency of accidents, and (3) providing
perspectives on the risk from such an event.
The scope of this program covers virtually all existing or
near-term operating plants with just a few exceptions due to their
unique design features. This was accomplished by performing
probabilistic safety analyses in a few generic "base" plant con-
figurations and then providing additional information to assess plant
design and/or operational features different from the "base"
configurations.
Those plant features found to be important overall, as a result
of our analyses, are summarized-below:
o The effectiveness of actions to restore offsite power once
it is lost,
o The degree of redundancy and reliability of the standby AC
power system,
o The standby reliability of decay heat removal systems
following loss of AC power,
0 DC power reliability and battery capacity including the
availability of instrumentation and control for decay heat
removal without AC power,
o Common service water dependencies between the emergency AC
power source and the decay heat removal systems,
o The magnitude of reactor coolant pump seal leakage and the
likelihood of a stuck open relief valve during a station
blackout,
o Containmeht size and design pressure,
0 Operator training and available procedures,
1
o External events which cause plant responses similar to an
actual station blackout (but may be better analyzed inde-
pendent of the station blackout issue).
Since the generic "base" plant configurations have differing
susceptibilities, a summary of the important features for each
configuration is given below:
(1) Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs): Initial Auxiliary
Feedwater System (AFW) unavailability, battery depletion
effects, possible AC dependency for Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) isolation, common service water dependencies in
AC/makeup systems and the likelihood of a large RCS pump
seal leak.
(2) Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) with isolation condenser(s):
loss of RCS integrity due to stuck-open relief valve or
large RCS pump seal leak, isolation condenser(s)
unavailability, and common service water dependencies in
AC/makeup systems.
(3) BWRs with High Pressure Coolant Injection - Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling (HPCI-RCIC): ability to operate
HPCI-RCIC under a prolonged blackout.
(4) BWRs with High Pressure Core Spray - Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling (HPCS-RCIC): initial HPCS-RCIC unavailability and
ability to operate RCIC under a prolonged blackout.
In addition to the station blackout accident sequences initiated
by system failures, current estimates {9,10,63] of the frequency of
major seismic, fire, and wind events which could cause blackout-
related core damage are in the range of lE-4 to less than lE-6 per
year. The likelihood depends on plant features such as the plant's
susceptibility to seismic activity and the effects on the switchyard
and control systems, susceptibility to fire and the degree of cable
separation, and susceptibility to wind or storm events and the
effect on offsite power, the switchyard, and on other plant
equipment. While not necessarily causing a station blackout, the
plant could lose the ability to supply power from the onsite
electrical buses to the AC/DC loads. If this should happen, plant
responses similar to an actual station blackout event would occur.
These external events may limit the degree to which station
blackout core melt frequencies can be lowered by improving the
features summarized in the preceding paragraphs.
In view of these results, one can see that the important factors
that determine-a plant's susceptability to a station blackout can be
plant unique. This report provides the analysis which will enable
one to compare specific existing plant features against the
2
important factors identified in this report and to decide upon the
importance of station blackout at each plant. This comparison and
the sensitivity analysis will provide part of the input for future
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decisions on the Station
Blackout issue.
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FIGURE L. TYPICAL FAULT TREE STRUCTURE
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*Turn "on" and "off" to select design variations and to introduce
failure modes at specific times following the initiating event.
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Table 1
PWR Base Configuration l*
Station Blackout - Core Damage Sequence Probabilities
(See Figure 5)
Sequences
(See Fig. 1)
1LlBl & TMLlQlBl
IL2B2 & TML2Q2 B2
(battery depletion)
4Q2B2
AL2B2 & TML2Q2B2
(CST depletion)
MQlBl, TMB3
Approximate Total
Point Value
6.5E-6
1.5E-5
1.OE-5
3.5E-6
lE-7
3.5E-5
Mean
Probability/Reactor
5% 50%
*
4;;14
zi$'Year
95%
3.OE-5 2.5E-6 1.5E-5 9.5E-5
5.OE-5 4.OE-6 2.5E-5 1.5E-4
6.OE-5 2.5E-6 2.OE-5 1.5E-4
l.OE-5 2.5E-8** 6.OE-6 3.5E-5
were not further evaluated
1.5E-4
*B&W With 1 Steam Train AFWS, 1 PORV, High Head AC Dependent HPI pumps,
2 AC Divisions)
*If the plant design is such that the operator cannot run the AFWS steam
driven pump without electrical power, then this sequence is not possible
and its frequency goes to zero while the frequencies of the other
sequences increase slightly.
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Table 7. Containment Failure Insights
Containment Type
Ice Condenser
Subatmospheric
or Small Dry
Large Dry
Mark I, Mark II
Mark III
Approximate Time to
Containment Failure
Following Onset of
Core Damage
1 hr.
2 hrs.
At or following AC
recovery
2 hrs.
6-12 hrs.
Following AC
recovery
10 hrs.
Following AC
recovery
2-4 hrs.
4-8 hrs.
10-15 hrs.
1 hr. following
AC recovery
Most Probable Containment
Failure Modes
Hydrogen burn, steam
spike
Overpressure
Hydrogen burn
Hydrogen burn,
spike
Overpressure
Hydrogen burn
steam
Overpressure
Hydrogen burn
Electrical penetration
failure
Overpressure
Overpressure
Hydrogen burn
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6.0 OBSERVATIONS, INSIGHTS, AND SENSITIVITIES
6.1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS
From the results of this study and particularly from a
review of the dominant sequence cutsets, there are a number of
general observations and insights which can be made and which
apply uniformly to large groups of plants. These are listed
below and pertain to those factors which are important to most,
if not all, the accident sequences resulting from station
blackout for a particular group of plants.
PWRS 1. Core damage probabilities due to system failures in
the 2-12 hour time period following station blackout
could be just as great if not greater than core
damage probabilities due to early system failures
following station blackout. This is due to sub-
sequent important AC/DC dependencies in the AFWS or
due to the loss of RCS integrity by reactor coolant
pump seal failure in the longer time periods.
2. Offsite power loss, diesel generator unavailability
and the nonrecovery of either offsite or onsite
power are important to virtually every station
blackout core damage sequence. Thus, improvements
in the reliability and recovery of both these
systems has direct impact on the entire core damage
probability from all sequences.
3. The major importance of DC power to station blackout
sequences is with regard to how long DC power can be
maintained before it is depleted without battery
charging or otherwise made unavailable due to
prolonged loss of AC effects. Maintaining DC power
allows for a system's possible, continued, AC-inde-
pendent operation, provides needed instrumentation
for monitoring plant status, provides necessary
lighting in vital plant areas, and plays an impor-
tant role in defining those periods when diesel
generator recovery will become very difficult if not
virtually impossible due to the DC dependencies of
field flashing, etc. Loss of DC power can also
somewhat hinder the ease with which offsite AC power
can be restored due to the need for local manual
closing of breakers.
4. Based on past judgments as well as current judgments
by analysts, containment failure by either H2 burn
or overpressure failure seem rather likely although
the large dry containment designs in particular may
have a reasonable chance of survivability due to their
large volumes and high design pressures. Containment
failure may even be induced by AC power recovery in
some situations (see Section 5.2).
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5. Though not analyzed in detail in these analyses,
external events could play a sizable role in
inducing station blackout or similar acting
scenarios (e.g., loss of vital control power) which
could then result in severe core damage. (See
Appendix J.)
BWRs (with isolation condensers):
1. Core damage probabilities due to failures in the
2-12 hour period could be greater than core damage
probabilities due to early system failures par-
ticularly for those plants with no AC-independent
system capable of providing primary system makeup.
This is highly dependent on the recirculation pump
seal LOCA probability.
2 & 3. Same as for PWRs.
4. Overpressure failure appears to be the most likely
containment failure mode and may happen rather
quickly depending on the electrical penetration seal
design. (See Section 5.2.)
5. Same as for PWRs.
BWRs (with HPCI-RCIC systems)
1. Core damage probabilities due to system failures in
the 2-12 hour time period appear to dominate the
overall core damage probability from station black-
out accident sequences. This is due primarily to
the fact that two AC-independent systems are avail-
able for early success of decay heat removal, but
both systems suffer from important AC/DC/ventilation
dependencies in the later time periods following
station blackout.
2 & 3. Same as for PWRs.
4. Same as for BWRs with isolation condensers.
5. Same as for PWRs.
BWRs (with HPCS-RCIC systems)
1. Core damage probabilities due to late system fail-
ures in the 2-12 hour time frame could be just as
great if not greater than core damage probabilities
due to -early failures of the HPCS and RCIC systems.
61
I
This is due primarily to the subsequent AC/DC/venti-
lation dependencies suffered by RCIC coupled with
early unavailability of the HPCS system. Overall,
however, BWRs with this third redundant train of
shutdown heat removal (in the form of HPCS and its
dedicated AC/DC/support system configuration) appear
to have the least susceptible design of all the
"base" plant configurations to station blackout.
2 & 3. Same as for PWRs.
4. Plants of this group with Mark II containment
designs will respond in a similar way with regard to
containment failures as the previous two BWR plant
groups have. BWRs with HPCS-RCIC systems with Mark
III containment designs are more susceptible to H2
burn failure as well as eventual overpressure
failure of containment. AC restoration could also
induce containment failure. (See Section 5.2.)
5. Same as for PWRs.
All Plants Fitting the "Base" Plant Configurations
With the exception of BWRs with HPCS and RCIC systems,
core damage probabilities due to station blackout and caused by
internal plant system failures can be summarized in the
following way-for plants which are like the "base" plant con-
figurations of this study. A "best guess" point estimate in
the low-lE-5/reactor year range appears to apply for all the
"base" configurations while the mean value is approximately
lE-4/reactor year. External event caused loss of AC accident
sequences appear to fall in the lE-4-lE-6/reactor year range or
lower depending on the specific plant's susceptibilities to
seismic, fire, wind, and other external event phenomena. These
are in comparison to the proposed safety goal figure of
lE-4/reactor year for all core damage sequences caused by both
internal and external plant failures. (See Appendix F.)
Not all plants fit the "base" plant configurations of this
study. Differences in the number of diesel generators and
onsite system power trains, in the AC system success criteria,
and in shutdown cooling system designs, can all affect the core
damage probability and ultimate risks associated with station
blackout. These differences are examined by reviewing the
specific accident sequence factors which affect each sequence's
importance and by performing simple sensitivity analyses which
demonstrate the effects of these differences. These topics are
discussed in the following section.
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